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JUSTICE BRENNAN: LEGACY OF A CHAMPION 
Dawn Johnsen* 
Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion. By Seth Stern and Stephen 
Wermiel. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 2010. 
Pp. xiv, 547. $35. 
Introduction 
In June 2012, the New York Times prominently reported that three-
quarters of Americans believe that U.S. Supreme Court decisions sometimes 
are influenced by the Justices’ personal or political views, while only 13% 
view their rulings as based solely on legal analysis without regard to such 
views.1 At one level, this should be unsurprising, a “dog bites man” story. 
Who sits on the Supreme Court—each Justice’s personal as well as legal 
views—of course affects the Court’s rulings. The Times, however, paired 
this poll result with the finding that the Court’s approval rating had fallen to 
44%, from 66% in the 1980s,2 thereby suggesting that the Court’s reputation 
may have fallen because the public perceived those influences as improper. 
It singled out the Court’s five-to-four decisions in Bush v. Gore3 and Citizens 
United,4 as well as the debate over the constitutionality of the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act,5 which the Court had not yet decided at the 
time of the poll.6 
The Court’s reputation may well have diminished because of the percep-
tion of improper influences, for example in the Court’s willingness in Bush 
v. Gore in effect to resolve a presidential election along ideological lines and 
contrary to widespread expectations that the Court would decline to play 
that role. Another likely factor behind the fall is the public’s substantive 
                                                                                                                      
 * Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I 
am grateful to Walter Dellinger, Bill Marshall, Jeff Powell, and Reva Siegel for their helpful 
suggestions, and to Richard Culbert and Kyle Fields for their excellent research assistance. 
 1. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in 
Poll, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2012, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 4. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 5. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
 6. Liptak & Kopicki, supra note 1. The Times story noted that other possible explana-
tions for the decreased approval rate included the lowered esteem in which Americans 
generally held the government, with approval ratings for Congress at 15% and the President at 
47%. Id. After the Court upheld Congress’s authority to enact the health care law a few weeks 
later (also by a five-to-four vote), see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012), the Court’s approval rating declined further to 41%. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, 
Public’s Opinion of Supreme Court Drops After Health Care Law Decision, N.Y. Times, July 
18, 2012, at A21. 
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disagreement with the Court’s rulings and the values they reflect, which 
seems especially likely in the case of the extraordinarily unpopular Citizens 
United decision.7  
The Times’ presentation of the poll results, however, risks perpetuating 
the myth that the content of the Court’s rulings should be—and can be—
wholly unrelated to the identities of the Justices sitting on the Court, and 
that the ideal should be judicial interpretations reached entirely without re-
gard to the Justices’ personal views and values.8 The poll’s phrasing is 
unfortunate: although “personal or political views”9 evokes negative associa-
tions with such improper factors as personal or partisan gain or prejudice, 
the scope of the term is not so limited, especially in the context of the poll’s 
two options. It also includes views and values that properly and inevitably 
inform legal analyses, particularly on the close constitutional questions most 
familiar to the American public: the meaning of broad, undefined guarantees 
such as “liberty,” “equal protection,” “cruel and unusual punishment,” and 
“freedom of speech.”10 
During the 1980s, when the Court’s approval rating was relatively high, 
commentators from both ends of the ideological spectrum remarked on the 
importance of Justices’ values and views, and bemoaned the public’s utter 
lack of attention to the Court and judicial appointments. President Ronald 
Reagan’s Department of Justice prefaced an extensive analysis of the mo-
mentous issues at stake for the Court and the Constitution with a call for 
attention to the “critical” yet “often overlooked” “values and philosophies” 
of federal judges.11 Professor Laurence Tribe similarly introduced a histori-
cal analysis of the Court’s vital role by describing Justices’ “powerful, if 
often unseen and rarely understood, impact on nearly every aspect of our 
lives.”12 Both were correct: because under our Constitution, “We, the Peo-
ple” govern, public appreciation of the actual influences on judicial 
                                                                                                                      
 7. Only 17% of Americans agreed with the Court’s decision. Public Approval of Ma-
jor Court Decisions, N.Y. Times (July 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2012/07/19/us/public-approval-of-major-court-decisions.html (citing a poll taken in 2010 after 
the decision’s release). 
 8. In editorializing about the Roberts Court, the New York Times implied that personal 
or political views should not influence Justices: “It is no wonder that the court’s standing in 
public opinion polls is at its lowest level in a quarter of a century, with just one in eight Amer-
icans believing that the Justices decide cases based only on legal analysis.” Editorial, The 
Radical Supreme Court, N.Y. Times, July 1, 2012, at SR10. 
 9. Results of the New York Times/CBS Poll: May 31–June 3, 2012, N.Y. Times, 4 
(June 7, 2012). 
 10. The Constitution of course is clear on some questions, and the Supreme Court often 
rules with a strong majority or even unanimously, but such questions do not tend to make the 
news or constitutional law casebooks.  
 11. Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Constitution in the 
Year 2000: Choices Ahead in Constitutional Interpretation, at v (1988) [hereinafter 
Constitution in 2000]; see Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on 
Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 Ind. L.J. 363, 
387–89 (2003) (discussing Constitution in 2000). 
 12. Laurence H. Tribe, God Save This Honorable Court 3 (1985). 
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decisionmaking should be seen as desirable, even if the Court’s popularity 
suffers when the public disagrees with it.13  
The Reagan Administration and Professor Tribe diverged, predictably, 
on the desirable content of Justices’ values and philosophies, and both 
pointed to the example of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. While Reagan offi-
cials singled out Justice Brennan as possessing precisely the wrong “values 
and philosophies” and targeted many of his “activist” decisions for overrul-
ing,14 Professor Tribe held him up as an exemplar of a “catalytic” Justice 
whose work on the Court greatly improved Americans’ lives.15  
Around this time, Justice Brennan agreed to cooperate in the writing of 
his biography by Stephen Wermiel,16 to whom he gave extraordinary access 
during his final few years of service before his 1990 retirement.17 Wermiel 
later partnered with coauthor Seth Stern18 to complete the project,19 and in 
2010, they published Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion, an engaging ac-
count of the life and work of one of the Court’s most influential, effective, 
and controversial Justices. Over those decades, the Court’s vital role in 
American life advanced from “often overlooked” and “rarely understood” to 
a frequent subject of news reports and popular cable comedy shows. For 
example, the Court’s ruling in Citizens United sparked a valuable nation-
wide conversation, from President Barack Obama’s State of the Union  
                                                                                                                      
 13. Justice Stephen Breyer argues persuasively that, in the long run, the Court will 
benefit from improved public understanding: “In a democracy, enduring institutions depend 
upon the enduring support of ordinary citizens. And citizens are more likely to support those 
institutions they understand.” Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work 217 
(2010). Of course, at various points in U.S. history, public attention to the Court has soared—
especially at times of strong dissatisfaction (for example, the Court’s pre-1937 invalidation of 
numerous progressive economic statutes)—and scholars have assessed the extent to which the 
Court generally adheres to public opinion. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Will of the 
People 12–13 (2009) (discussing “four critical periods in the American people’s changing 
relationship with judicial review and the Supreme Court”). 
 14. For example, William Bradford Reynolds, then–Assistant Attorney General of the 
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, said in a 1986 speech, “Justice Bren-
nan thus prefers to turn his back on text and historical context, and argues instead for a 
jurisprudence that rests, at bottom, on a faith in the idea of a living, evolving Constitution of 
uncertain and wholly uninhibited meaning.” P. 507. Gary McDowell, a top advisor to Attorney 
General Edwin Meese, later recalled, “Brennan was the most articulate and consistent activist” 
and “pretty much our guy [to target].” P. 503 (alteration in original); see also Office of Le-
gal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation (1988) 
[hereinafter Guidelines] (listing by issue Supreme Court opinions that the Reagan Admin-
istration believed were wrongly decided); Stephen J. Markman & Alfred S. Regnery, The 
Mind of Justice Brennan: A 25-Year Tribute, Nat’l Rev., May 18, 1984, at 38 (“Brennan is 
among the purest of the result-oriented judges who first determine how they want a decision to 
come out (the ‘fundamental fairness’ standard) and then go about trying to find a legal justifi-
cation.”). 
 15. Tribe, supra note 12, at 12, 36. 
 16. Fellow in Law and Government, American University Washington College of Law. 
 17. Authors’ Note, pp. 549–50. 
 18. Legal Affairs Reporter, Congressional Quarterly. 
 19. Authors’ Note, p. 550. 
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address,20 to “Occupy” demonstrations across the nation,21 to a running 
“joke” by comedian Stephen Colbert that included the formation of an ac-
tive Super PAC and Colbert’s indirect candidacy in a state presidential 
primary.22  
Although the public better appreciates the extent of the Court’s power, 
partisan battles fuel continued confusion about the proper role of Justices’ 
personal views and values. During Senate confirmation proceedings marked 
by lengthy holds, filibuster threats, and little constructive dialogue, judicial 
nominees strive to say as little of substance as possible. They seek to 
minimize the extent to which their legal views—let alone their personal 
values—matter by emphasizing that their role is simply to interpret, not make, 
law.23 As the charge of “judicial activism” once leveled at Justice Brennan 
increasingly focuses on the ideological right of the Court for overruling 
precedent and striking down statutes, nominees from both political parties 
engage in misleading oversimplification of the Justices’ role. Chief Justice 
John Roberts, for example, during his confirmation hearing analogized a 
Justice to a baseball umpire who merely calls balls and strikes.24 President 
Obama’s modest suggestion that a capacity for empathy is a desirable 
characteristic in a judge met with widespread Republican ridicule,25 which 
in turn led Justice Sonia Sotomayor to disavow the President’s position in 
her confirmation hearing: “I . . . wouldn’t approach the issue of judging in 
the way the President does. . . . [J]udges can’t rely on what’s in their heart. 
They don’t determine the law. Congress makes the laws. The job of a judge 
is to apply the law.”26 Reform of our broken appointment process should be 
a national priority, but Senate confirmation hearings are unlikely to be 
                                                                                                                      
 20. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 2010 
Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 55, at 8 (Jan. 27, 2010).  
 21. See Meghan Barr, Occupy Wall Street: Protestors to Demonstrate Outside Court-
houses, Huffington Post (Jan. 20, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/01/20/occupy-wall-street-courthouses_n_1218196.html. 
 22. See Dahlia Lithwick, Colbert v. the Court: Why, in the Battle over Citizens United, 
the Supreme Court Never Had a Chance, Slate (Feb. 2, 2012, 5:30 PM), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/02/stephen_colbert_is_winning_ 
the_war_against_the_supreme_court_and_citizens_united_.html (explaining how Colbert 
formed his Super PAC and used it to support Herman Cain in the South Carolina primary after 
Cain had withdrawn from the presidential race). 
 23. See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Should Ideology Matter in Selecting Federal Judg-
es?: Ground Rules for the Debate, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 463 (2005) (discussing the use of 
vacuous and misleading language in the context of judicial confirmations). 
 24. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
 25. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be 
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary) (“I fear that [the President’s] ‘empathy standard’ is another step 
down the road to a liberal activist, results-oriented, and relativistic world where laws lose their 
fixed meaning . . . [and] unelected judges set policy.”). 
 26. Id. at 120 (statement of Sonia Sotomayor). 
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conducive to nuanced conversations and enhanced public understanding 
about difficult and divisive constitutional questions.  
The words and work of Justices who have run the political gauntlet to 
life tenure are far more promising sources to educate the citizenry—in the 
words of Justice Stephen Breyer, quoting Thomas Jefferson, a valuable 
means “to illuminate . . . the minds of the people at large”27 about the 
Court’s “role in protecting the Constitution.”28 In that vein, Stern and Werm-
iel’s biography of Justice Brennan instructs by example about the complex 
relevance of a Justice’s views, values, and philosophies to the interpretive 
process. Justice Brennan is an ideal case study, for “while he remains a hero 
to two generations of progressive lawyers, including Presidents Bill Clinton 
and Barack Obama, he is also still the very symbol of judicial activism de-
cried by conservatives” (p. xiv). Part I of this Review endorses Stern and 
Wermiel’s central claim that Justice Brennan’s personal abilities, attributes, 
and values, including his strong capacity for empathy, enabled him to be-
come a “liberal champion.” Part II examines Justice Brennan’s extraordinary 
behind-the-scenes work in representative cases drawn from the biography 
through the lens of his famed “Rule of Five”—the number of Justices need-
ed for a majority—as the composition of the Court changed dramatically 
over three distinct periods of Justice Brennan’s service. Part III assesses Jus-
tice Brennan’s legacy on the overarching issue of interpretive methodology 
by examining how his support for the constitutional value of “human  
dignity” and the concept of a “living Constitution” has fared against calls 
for judicial restraint and originalism.  
By chronicling the life’s work of one of the Court’s greatest Justices, 
Stern and Wermiel show that judicial selection is a choice not among um-
pires but between a Justice William Brennan and a Justice Felix Frankfurter, 
a Justice Sonia Sotomayor and a Chief Justice John Roberts—all exception-
ally smart and well-trained lawyers who fully understand the rules of the 
game and the relevance of what they personally bring to the awesome re-
sponsibility of interpreting the Constitution.  
I. Liberal Champion 
Stern and Wermiel ably establish their central claim that Justice Brennan 
was a liberal champion. Even readers generally familiar with Justice Bren-
nan’s work will be impressed to read about the many landmark opinions he 
authored to establish constitutional protections now viewed as fundamental: 
the justiciability of electoral redistricting questions29 which paved the way 
for the “one person, one vote” principle;30 vibrant First Amendment speech 
                                                                                                                      
 27. Breyer, supra note 13, at 218 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 28. Id. Justice Breyer also approvingly cites the words and efforts at public education of 
Justices David Souter and Sandra Day O’Connor. See id. at 218–19. 
 29. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 30. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
Johnsen FTP 4_C.doc 3/13/2013 8:58 AM 
1156 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 111:1151 
protections for unpopular expressive conduct31 and “vehement, caustic” crit-
icism of government and public officials;32 protections for racial minorities33 
and individuals discriminated against on the basis of sex;34 the incorporation 
of Bill of Rights protections against the states;35 and basic access to justice 
in federal court for those challenging criminal convictions36 and before ad-
ministrative agencies for those living in “brutal need.”37 Even more striking, 
the biography also documents many significant opinions that do not bear 
Justice Brennan’s name but on which he labored to achieve a majority and 
shape the Court’s approach and the nation’s future.38 
The title “Liberal Champion” captures the two key characteristics of 
Justice Brennan’s career on the Court. His contributions were substantively 
“liberal” in the common meaning of the word: strongly protective of indi-
vidual rights and liberties, especially “to ensure justice for all ‘who do not 
partake of the abundance of American life,’ including the poor, minorities, 
and the criminally accused.”39 Justice Brennan earned the title “champion” 
for his remarkably effective leadership and tireless work on a Court that 
moved steadily to the right during most of his service.  
Justice Brennan’s tenure illustrates that both descriptors are relative 
terms. The press tends to speak of “liberal” and “conservative” wings of any 
                                                                                                                      
 31. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (finding a law banning flag desecra-
tion to be inconsistent with the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
(same). 
 32. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 33. E.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1979) (rejecting a “freedom of choice” 
approach to remedying desegretation); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (protecting the 
NAACP’s First Amendment right to advocate for racial equality). 
 34. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that discrimination on the basis 
of sex triggers heightened scrutiny); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality 
opinion) (finding that discrimination on the basis of sex should trigger strict scrutiny). 
 35. E.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause).  
 36. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding that the failure to appeal a conviction 
does not bar the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus), overruled in part by Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 443 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 37. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(recognizing strong procedural protections for certain public benefits).  
 38. E.g., infra text accompanying notes 62–68 (discussing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 
(1958)); notes 79–80 (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); and note 101 (discussing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. 
of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)). 
 39. Pp. 306–07 (quoting a 1968 speech by Justice Brennan). Professor Frank Michel-
man’s review notes that Stern and Wermiel do not define what they mean by “liberal,” and 
after a thoughtful discussion of the term’s possible meanings concludes with a helpful sum-
mary: “[T]he contemporary egalitarian/Kantian liberalism of Rawls et al . . . . jibe[s] neatly 
and suggestively with the authors’ designation of Brennan (but presumably not Roberts, 
Rehnquist, Friedman, Hayek, Posner, Epstein, Peckham, or Nozick) as ‘liberal.’ ” Frank I. 
Michelman, Our Liberalism, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1409, 1414 (2011) (reviewing Justice Brennan: 
Liberal Champion). 
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Court, including the Roberts Court,40 but the dramatic ideological shifts dur-
ing Justice Brennan’s thirty-four-year tenure, following his recess 
appointment by Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower, drive home 
the radically different meanings of the terms. In Justice Brennan’s early 
years, he sat at the ideological center of the Court, wooed toward the right 
wing by Justice Frankfurter and “somewhat less willing than Black, Doug-
las, or Warren to support civil liberties claims and economic underdogs” 
(p. 137). By the end of the 1985–86 Term, not only Justices Brennan and 
Thurgood Marshall (the only remaining Justice appointed by a Democratic 
President), but Republican appointees Harry Blackmun and John Paul Ste-
vens, “once considered part of the traditional center, found themselves 
firmly in the liberal camp.”41  
What makes someone a champion also depends on where one sits. Jus-
tice Brennan appreciated that his friend and strong ally on the Court, Justice 
Marshall, was one of the United States’ great liberal champions for his civil 
rights work before joining the Court.42 But Justice Brennan privately ex-
pressed disappointment that Justice Marshall failed to do his part on the 
Court to preserve the Warren Court’s legacy.43 As a Supreme Court Justice, 
Justice Brennan was the more effective champion of the liberal constitution-
al values that they shared.44 Indeed, Stern and Wermiel make a strong case 
that he was “the most forceful and effective liberal ever to serve on the 
Court” (p. xiii), and note that “[e]ven Antonin Scalia, not a fan of much of 
what Brennan accomplished, called him ‘probably the most influential jus-
tice of the century’ ” (p. 545). They also convey a strong sense of what 
enabled Justice Brennan to work so effectively with Justices who were not 
                                                                                                                      
 40. See, e.g., Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, 
CBSNews.com (July 1, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/ 
roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/. 
 41. P. 495 (quoting Al Kamen, Supreme Court’s Moderate Bloc Is Shrinking, Wash. 
Post, July 14, 1986, at A1) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justices Blackmun and Stevens 
both said that they believed that the Court, not their ideological positions, had shifted. See Su-
preme Court Justice Says High Court Not Always Enjoyable, Associated Press, July 7, 1986, 
available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/Supreme-Court-Justice-Says-High-Court- 
Not-Always-Enjoyable-With-AM-Scotus-Rdp-Bjt/id-cb81831f7cf10036b6f914583f1218a4; Bill 
Mears, Justice Stevens Reveals His Thoughts on “Radical” Court, CNN.com (Sept. 30, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-30/us/us_scotus-preview-stevens_1_high-court-rulings-justice-
stevens?_s=PM:US. 
 42. See p. 431. 
 43. Justice Brennan said of Justice Marshall in 1988, “What the hell happened when he 
came on the Court, I’m not sure, but he doesn’t seem to have had the same interest . . . . He 
has some areas where he does and when he really gets involved with a case . . . he just does an 
absolutely superb job. But when he’s not interested, whatever I do, that’s all right with him.” P. 
431 (second alteration in original). Brennan’s guess was that Marshall had given up in despair. 
P. 431.  
 44. Stern and Wermiel speculate that Justice Marshall may have been less effective 
because he lacked Justice Brennan’s earlier, positive experience of being part of a solid liberal 
majority on the Court. See p. 432. They also cite Justice Marshall’s health problems and very 
different temperament. See pp. 431–32. 
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inclined to agree with him: they portray a “keen workplace politician”45 with 
a strong work ethic who treated his colleagues with respect and patience and 
who was also a man of humility46 and great empathy.47  
Because they published their work many years after beginning it and af-
ter Justice Brennan’s retirement and death (events that naturally prompted 
assessments of his jurisprudence and legacy48), Stern and Wermiel will be 
judged in part by what their biography adds to earlier writings about Justice 
Brennan and the Justices with whom he served. Theirs is the most compre-
hensive work on Justice Brennan to date, contributing a bounty of details, 
from the mundane to the fascinating. They offer some of their own valuable 
perspectives, but the biography’s greatest value lies in its accessible review 
of how the Justices decided cases during Justice Brennan’s thirty-four years 
on the Court, with Justice Brennan often leading the way. They primarily 
present his life and achievements chronologically, but also successfully in-
tegrate thoughtful thematic discussions in chapters devoted to, for example, 
civil rights, crime, death and dignity, and sex discrimination. Some readers 
may find the biography excessively dense—by one count, 452 of 547 pages 
are devoted to describing how the Court decided cases49—but other readers, 
whether or not formally trained in the law, will delight in the richness of that 
                                                                                                                      
 45. P. 192. Stern and Wermiel also quote Professor Mark Tushnet, who captured well 
what made Justice Brennan so effective: “Like all good political leaders, Brennan structured 
the process of decision and gave his colleagues reasons for doing what he understands to be 
the right thing.” P. 464 (quoting Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 748, 764 (1995)). 
 46. The biography is sprinkled with examples of cases and incidents for which Justice 
Brennan later acknowledged regret. For example, he drafted a concurrence in Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that would have allowed the states more flexibility in crafting their 
own procedures; later, as Miranda warnings became ubiquitous and successful, he expressed 
relief that he had not published the concurrence: “Obviously, it would have been just dead 
wrong . . . . Thank heavens I woke up.” P. 239. For another example, see infra note 54. 
 47. Stern and Wermiel refer to “the empathy for which Brennan would become fa-
mous.” P. 249. Among the many others who have commented on Justice Brennan’s capacity 
for empathy, Professor and former-Brennan-clerk Larry Kramer related this characteristic to 
Justice Brennan’s success as a Justice: “Justice Brennan believed in the goodness of people. 
He believed in the dignity of each individual and in the capacity of each person to be better.” 
Larry Kramer, Believing in the Goodness of People, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1403, 1406 (2011) (re-
viewing Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion). Several of Justice Brennan’s other former clerks 
help complete the picture. For example, Judge Marsha Berzon’s review affectionately empha-
sizes that Justice Brennan was a relatively ordinary man—like many judges, “not all that 
interesting”—whose extraordinary accomplishments depended on his “willingness to sacrifice 
doctrinal purity and perfectly organized opinions in an effort to put together majority deci-
sions.” Marsha S. Berzon, The Common Man?, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1395, 1395–96 (2011) 
(reviewing Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion). 
 48. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, in The War-
ren Court in Historical and Political Perspective 123, 123 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) 
(“Justice William J. Brennan’s eminent, if not preeminent, position in the annals of the Warren 
Court is now well established. The depth and clarity of his vision, the lucidity of its doctrinal 
expression, his uncanny knack for creating crucial court majorities from the splinters of dis-
parate perspectives have all been amply documented.”). 
 49. Kramer, supra note 47, at 1404. 
Johnsen FTP 4_C.doc 3/13/2013 8:58 AM 
April 2013] Legacy of a Champion 1159 
detail, which can be mined for a host of ends. Following the biography’s 
lead, this Review focuses on Justice Brennan’s work on the Court: what he 
accomplished in his exceptional tenure as a Justice.50  
II. Rule of Five 
The title of Dahlia Lithwick’s New York Times review of Justice Bren-
nan: Liberal Champion51 could have titled the biography itself: Getting to 
Five. Here is how Stern and Wermiel tell the widely known story of Justice 
Brennan’s “Rule of Five”:  
Brennan liked to greet his new clerks each fall by asking them what they 
thought was the most important thing they needed to know as they began 
their work in his chambers. The pair of stumped novices would watch 
quizzically as Brennan held up five fingers. Brennan then explained that 
with five votes, you could accomplish anything. (p. 196) 
Many earlier books and articles recount versions of this story,52 which may 
explain Stern and Wermiel’s decision to relegate it to a single paragraph in 
the middle of the eighth chapter. Regardless, the principle of “getting to 
five” implicitly dominates the biography, as it did Justice Brennan’s career 
on the Court, and Stern and Wermiel succeed, at least indirectly, in the es-
sential challenge of illuminating this “Rule” that is so closely associated 
with him. 
Justice Brennan’s struggle with the inexorable need for five votes raises 
general questions of pragmatism versus principle, but for a Justice, that fa-
miliar balance is radically defined by the unusual nature of Supreme Court 
decisionmaking. The “Rule of Five” reflects the fact that a Justice writing 
for the Court does not write solely for himself. Justice Brennan was very 
skilled at attracting and holding a majority to advance his constitutional posi-
tion, but his unusual ability and willingness to accommodate the necessary 
range of Justices meant that “his” opinions often little resembled his ideal. 
He was impatient with criticism of these opinions when it failed to appre-
ciate what it took to get to five (pp. 156–57). Contrary to the accusations 
                                                                                                                      
 50. Dahlia Lithwick’s insightful review makes the point that Stern and Wermiel are less 
successful in conveying “what animated this man, what drove and moved him,” and that after 
reading about the early chapters of his life, “one is hard pressed to know how these early expe-
riences shaped him or his jurisprudence.” Dahlia Lithwick, Getting to Five, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
8, 2010, at BR20 (reviewing Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion).  
 51. Id.  
 52. For example, Professor H. Jefferson Powell, in a fascinating book chapter entitled 
“The Rule of Five,” sketches four fictional Justices, the most attractive of whom believes in a 
“strong Rule of Five”—as did Justice Brennan—and favors interpreting the Constitution to 
achieve the “humanly best outcome” consistent with the text (which almost always allows for 
the humanly best outcome). H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional Conscience: The 
Moral Dimension of Judicial Decision 16–37 (2008). Professor Powell draws on an earli-
er work by Professor Tushnet, who explained that “Brennan’s ‘rule of five’—or as the 
narrative of activism and restraint would have it, rule by five”—was susceptible to different 
interpretations: “Some clerks understood Brennan to mean that it takes five votes to do any-
thing, others that with five votes you could do anything.” Tushnet, supra note 45, at 763. 
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that Justice Brennan was somehow improperly outcome driven, he emerges 
from Stern and Wermiel’s meticulous descriptions of the internal delibera-
tions of case after case, on Court after Court, as a Justice who was 
consistently motivated by what he believed was the constitutionally correct 
and principled outcome. Several of the cases highlighted in the biography 
suffice to illustrate. This Review considers those cases in three distinct time 
periods of Justice Brennan’s service: his initial six years on the Court, his 
six years on the Warren Court with a firm five-Justice “liberal” majority, and 
his remaining twenty-two years of service on the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts.  
A. 1956 to 1962 
Justice Brennan joined the Court just two years after Brown v. Board of 
Education.53 In his first years on the Court, his former law professor Justice 
Frankfurter energetically recruited him to the cause of extreme judicial re-
straint and legislative deference, with early occasional success that Justice 
Brennan later repudiated.54 In the most significant example, Roth v. United 
States,55 Justice Frankfurter, with the help of a clerk’s memo on the regula-
tion of speech in the colonies and thirteen original states, convinced Justice 
Brennan to change his approach in writing the majority opinion and to up-
hold an obscenity conviction by finding that obscene speech is not speech at 
all within the meaning of the First Amendment (p. 124). Justices Hugo 
Black and William Douglas dissented and would have reversed the convic-
tion (p. 123). Professor and former-Brennan-clerk Robert O’Neil has 
speculated that Roth would be the near-unanimous choice among Justice 
Brennan’s former law clerks for the Brennan decision most deserving of 
being overruled.56 Despite its deep flaws, with Roth, Justice Brennan effec-
tively expanded constitutional protection for sexually explicit material,57 and 
for years after, Justice Brennan led the Court’s difficult search for a worka-
ble definition of unprotected obscenity.58 He was uncharacteristically 
unsuccessful and would write at the center of a fractured Court unable to 
give general guidance, in part because obscenity was a rare issue on which 
                                                                                                                      
 53. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 54. Justice Brennan reported that his biggest mistake on the Court was joining Justice 
Frankfurter in upholding the government’s decision to strip a man of his U.S. citizenship for 
voting in a Mexican election. Pp. 134–35 (discussing Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), 
overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)). 
 55. 354 U.S. 467 (1957). 
 56. Robert M. O’Neil, A Justice for All Seasons, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1417, 1421–22 (2011) 
(reviewing Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion). 
 57. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 487–90 (distinguishing between obscene material and sexual 
material). 
 58. In 1964, for example, press reports described him as “the Court spokesman on 
obscenity cases” and a “chief arbiter” on obscenity. P. 254.  
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Chief Justice Earl Warren sat to Justice Brennan’s right.59 In 1973 Justice 
Brennan finally abandoned the effort to define a category of unprotected 
obscenity, which he concluded was unworkable censorship, and dissented 
when the Court (which had moved to the ideological right) finally achieved 
a majority for a three-part test for obscenity.60 
Obscenity notwithstanding, within a couple of years Justice Brennan 
stood firmly with Chief Justice Warren—and the Chief Justice leaned heavi-
ly on him. Stern and Wermiel speculate that Chief Justice Warren “saw that 
Brennan could theorize about the law in a way he could not” (p. 106). They 
favorably cite one scholar’s conclusion that “it was ‘the Brennan Court,’ ” 
not the Warren Court.61 By the end of this initial six-year period, the two 
voted reliably together and often with Justices Black and Douglas, and Jus-
tice Brennan served as the chief strategist for getting the four to five. Before 
each of the conferences during which the Justices would discuss and prelim-
inarily vote on cases, and the Chief Justice would assign cases when in the 
majority, Chief Justice Warren would meet separately with Justice Brennan 
and solicit his advice (p. 183).  
One remarkable assignment came early: Justice Brennan drafted and 
maintained unanimity behind the Court’s historic 1958 opinion in Cooper v. 
Aaron,62 which took a hard line against Southern resistance to racial deseg-
regation (pp. 145–50). Rather than simply operating by the “Rule of Five,” 
in this rare case the Justices saw a strong need for unanimity—in effect a 
“Rule of Nine.” They agreed that equal protection prohibited segregation, 
but divided on what specifically it required by way of remedy. Stern and 
Wermiel examine at length this early instance of consensus building, which 
foreshadowed Justice Brennan’s later “reputation among Supreme Court 
reporters for his willingness to sacrifice style in order to build consensus,” 
often resulting in “nearly colorless compromises” (p. 147). Justice Bren-
nan’s first draft in Cooper was “bland by design” to maintain unanimity (p. 
147), but he nonetheless had to accept numerous suggestions from Justices 
John Harlan and Black; at one point Justice Tom Clark actually drafted a 
dissent (pp. 147–50). Justice Brennan’s challenge peaked when the Justices 
decided to issue a jointly signed opinion, rather than the traditional opinion 
                                                                                                                      
 59. P. 252. Chief Justice Warren concurred separately in Roth because he felt that Jus-
tice Brennan’s opinion went too far in protecting sexually explicit speech. P. 125. Stern and 
Wermiel speculate that Justice Brennan may have subsequently ruled against protecting the 
sexually explicit speech at issue in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), out of 
deference to Chief Justice Warren, p. 263, a decision that Brennan later appeared to regret, see 
p. 275. 
 60. Pp. 365–68 (discussing Justice Brennan’s evolving views and his dissents in Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973)). 
Stern and Wermiel note that he waited until after Chief Justice Warren left the Court to make 
this radical change. P. 366.  
 61. P. 491 (quoting Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief: Earl Warren and the Su-
preme Court, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 922, 923 (1983) (book review)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 62. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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with a single author joined by others.63 As a result, Chief Justice Warren 
announced the decision and Justice Brennan’s central role remained largely 
unknown for many years—another early example of his effective but often-
uncredited work on the Court (p. 150). Justice Brennan later would urge the 
Cooper approach of a consensus joint opinion—albeit unsuccessfully—in 
two cases of extraordinary importance: United States v. Nixon, rejecting 
President Richard Nixon’s assertion of executive privilege,64 and Buckley v. 
Valeo, setting forth First Amendment limitations on Congress’s authority to 
regulate campaign contributions and setting the stage for Citizens United.65  
Stern and Wermiel briefly discuss Cooper’s significance beyond the is-
sue of race, intriguingly revealing what Justice Brennan resisted changing in 
his draft opinion. Contrary to his later general accommodation of other Jus-
tices’ views, Justice Brennan refused Justice Harlan’s request that he omit a 
passage equating the Court’s decisions interpreting the Constitution with the 
words of the Constitution itself (p. 149). Decades later, this characterization 
of the Court’s interpretive authority became the target of conservative at-
tacks on the “activist” Court, led by President Reagan’s Attorney General 
Edwin Meese.66 Although his attack proved politically unsuccessful, which 
is unsurprising given Cooper responsed to Southern resistance to Brown, 
Attorney General Meese made a good point: Justice Brennan’s language 
was overstated—perhaps understandably so given that the context was a 
challenge to the Court’s fundamental authority.67 Another telling detail is 
Justice Brennan’s initial resistance to Justice Harlan’s suggestion that the 
opinion note that all three Justices who had joined the Court since Brown 
supported that decision; Justice Brennan feared that such a statement might 
signal that “the Constitution only has the meaning that can command a ma-
jority as that majority may change with shifting membership” (p. 149). The 
Reagan Administration later would frame its attack on Justice Brennan and 
the Warren Court on precisely these grounds.68 At this early stage in his ser-
vice, Justice Brennan foresaw the danger and disfavored an 
acknowledgment that Justices’ identities matter: “Whatever truth there may 
be in that idea, I think it would be fatal in this fight to provide ammunition 
from the mouth of this Court in support of it” (p. 149). In both instances, 
Justice Brennan sought to avoid being open about the Court’s role in order 
to avoid controversy.  
                                                                                                                      
 63. P. 149. Justice Frankfurter infuriated Justice Brennan and the other Justices when 
he later insisted on issuing a separate concurrence. Pp. 150–52. 
 64. Pp. 379–80 (discussing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)). 
 65. P. 442 (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)). 
 66. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979, 986–87 
(1987). 
 67. See generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial 
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 105, 
112–20 (2004) (describing theories of judicial supremacy and departmentalism). 
 68. See Meese III, supra note 66; sources cited supra note 14. 
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Among the biography’s most valuable contributions are Justice Bren-
nan’s own assessments of his legacy as he related them to Wermiel. The 
opinion that Justice Brennan cited as his safest and most “completely ac-
cepted” comes from this early period.69 In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan 
led the Court in 1962 to hold that concerns about the judicial role and justi-
ciability did not foreclose review of electoral districts that afforded 
dramatically disproportionate power to some voters.70 For example, in Ten-
nessee, some urban districts were populated with twenty-five times the 
number of voters as some rural districts.71 Baker abrogated a 1946 prece-
dent72 to pave the way for a case that established the then-revolutionary 
principle of “one person, one vote.”73 Stern and Wermiel describe striking 
interactions among the Justices in crafting this opinion that exemplify the 
sacrifices in coherence of argument sometimes required to secure the critical 
five (pp. 184–90). The initial post-argument vote was four-to-four, with Jus-
tice Potter Stewart undecided and requesting reargument. Securing Justice 
Stewart’s vote required omitting any “hint of a remedy or what standards 
lower courts should employ” (p. 187). At the same time, Justice Brennan 
feared that too narrow an opinion would have lost Justice Douglas, who 
might have written a concurrence that would have alienated Justice Stewart. 
Justice Clark surprisingly supplied a fifth vote, but only after Justice Bren-
nan drove to Justice Clark’s home in a snowstorm to discuss the case. This 
created for Justice Brennan the dilemma of whether to strengthen the opin-
ion and allow Justice Stewart to dissent. In the end, Justice Brennan opted 
for keeping Justice Stewart and a six-Justice majority with a watered-down 
opinion, criticized by the press for what it left unanswered.74 Justice Frank-
furter felt so strongly that the Court had exceeded its authority75—at one 
point comparing the situation to the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion76—that 
he blamed the Court’s decision for a disabling stroke that he suffered shortly 
after the case was announced (p. 191).  
Justice Brennan’s principle of equality in voting is certain to remain 
constitutional bedrock. He celebrated his hard-fought victory by reading the 
                                                                                                                      
 69. P. 190 (“There’s nothing that the Court’s done in my time that was so completely 
accepted as the whole result of the reapportionment fight . . . .”); see also p. 544 (“They’re not 
going to unstitch Baker and Carr . . . .”). 
 70. Pp. 184–90 (discussing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).  
 71. P. 184. The inequity was even larger in some other states. See, e.g., p. 183 (“One 
state senator represented Los Angeles County, which had a population of more than 6 million 
people, while another represented three northern California rural counties with a total popula-
tion of 14,294.”). 
 72. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), abrogating Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 
(1946). 
 73. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–58 (1964).  
 74. Pp. 189–90. The Washington Post editorialized, “On the basis of legal scholarship, 
judicial tradition and forensic ability a jury would award victory to the minority.” P. 190. 
 75. See p. 184. 
 76. P. 184 (“[Justice Frankfurter] argued that taking up reapportionment would be an 
error akin to the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion . . . .”). 
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entire opinion from the bench (pp. 189–90). Chief Justice Warren passed 
him a congratulatory note along the bench that read, “[I]t is a great day for 
the Irish” with “Irish” crossed out and replaced by “country” (p. 190). 
B. 1962 to 1968 
When Justice Frankfurter’s health compelled him to resign in 1962, 
President John F. Kennedy appointed Arthur Goldberg and thereby provided 
the generally reliable fifth vote that propelled the Warren/Brennan Court to 
its peak for the next six years.77 During the first four Terms of Justice Gold-
berg’s service, Justice Brennan “voted with the majority an astounding 97 
percent of the time” (p. 279). Earlier works document well the accomplish-
ments of the Warren Court, but the biography adds Justice Brennan’s own 
perspectives, including his perception of his most secure legacy from this 
remarkable period: his part in supplying the Court’s rationale for applying 
Bill of Rights protections to the states through selective incorporation.78 
Stern and Wermiel also demonstrate that “perhaps no justice deserves more 
credit for advancing the cause of the civil rights movement during the first 
half of the 1960s than Brennan” (p. 211). They describe Justice Brennan’s 
tireless behind-the-scenes work on opinions that did not bear his name, sin-
gling out the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,79 which invalidated a 
Connecticut ban on contraception as violating the constitutional right to pri-
vacy, as an outstanding example “of the silent hand of Brennan shaping an 
opinion” (p. 279). Stern and Wermiel also detail Justice Brennan’s substan-
tial contributions to Justice Blackmun’s opinion for seven Justices in Roe v. 
Wade.80 
Still, the “Rule of Five” continued to constrain Justice Brennan’s opin-
ions because the agreement among the five “liberals” sometimes did not 
extend beyond the bottom line. The biography’s most illuminating contribu-
tions from this period describe disputes among the five, often not apparent 
from the opinions themselves, in which it was Justice Brennan’s “stalwart 
allies that made his job as coalition builder harder” (p. 228). Justice Bren-
nan’s best-known opinion from this period, New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,81 announced dramatic new constitutional limitations on state defa-
mation law which protect the right to criticize public officials by requiring 
proof of “actual malice.”82 The Justices were “unanimous on the ultimate 
goal, but did not agree about how to get there” (p. 223), and they recognized 
the great value in unanimity in a case that would dramatically disrupt state 
                                                                                                                      
 77. See pp. 191, 195–96. 
 78. P. 544 (“Brennan . . . predict[ed] he had built up a considerable legacy that would 
be difficult to undo. ‘They’re not going to unstitch the extension of the Bill of Rights against 
the states—that is the most important thing I can guess will not happen,’ Brennan said in 
1988.”); see also p. 239 (discussing the process of selective incorporation). 
 79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 80. Pp. 371–74; 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 81. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 82. See pp. 220–27.  
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law.83 After eight grueling drafts during which the majority threatened to 
unravel (p. 224), Justice Brennan crafted an unusually eloquent opinion for 
the Court that elaborated on the “central meaning” of the First Amendment: 
that the protection of “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials” is vital to the success and integ-
rity of the United States.84 Three Justices from the “liberal” bloc, however, 
joined concurring opinions because they favored greater speech protections 
than the balancing inherent in the actual malice test.85 Justice Brennan later 
regretted having used the word “malice” (p. 227), and though Stern and 
Wermiel do not note it, he dissented from the Court’s later refusal to extend 
New York Times beyond public officials and public figures to protect “vehe-
ment” speech even against private figures on matters of public interest.86 
During this period, Justice Brennan’s reputation as a liberal champion 
was sullied by an incident in which he acted pragmatically and cautiously—
many would say excessively so. In 1965, he came under political heat from 
the right for offering Michael Tigar a position as a law clerk because, as a 
student at Berkeley, Tigar had taken part in activities described by some as 
pro-Communist (pp. 264–74). Justice Brennan ultimately succumbed to the 
pressure by withdrawing the offer (pp. 269–70), which he later regretted.87 
This incident was reminiscent of Justice Brennan’s confirmation hearing, 
when he was also criticized for taking an overly cautious approach, again to 
avoid embroiling the Court in controversy. In 1954 before joining the Court, 
and while the country suffered the excesses of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s 
“guilt by association” efforts to rid the government, unions, and Hollywood 
of alleged Communists, Justice Brennan had publicly warned against over-
reacting to communism’s threat by sacrificing “all of the guarantees of 
justice and fair play and simple human dignity which have made our land 
what it is” (p. 63). Later, when Senator McCarthy took part in his confirma-
tion hearing to grill him about such statements, then-nominee Brennan 
adopted an extremely conciliatory stance typical of many nominees, seem-
ingly agreeing with Senator McCarthy’s concerns about the Communist 
threat (pp. 115–16). Justice Brennan later explained that he had felt the need 
to take special care to avoid controversy because he had been recess ap-
pointed and had already been serving on the Court (p. 117). 
C. 1968 to 1990 
In June 1968, in a fateful move of enormous consequence for the nation, 
Chief Justice Warren decided to resign so that President Lyndon B. Johnson 
                                                                                                                      
 83. See pp. 225–26. 
 84. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270, 273. 
 85. P. 226; 376 U.S. at 293–97 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 297–305 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring in the result). Justice Douglas joined both concurrences. 
 86. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 367 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 87. See p. 274 (“I wish to hell maybe that I’d had guts enough to tell them all to go to 
hell and then taken them on.”). 
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could appoint the next Chief Justice before the November presidential elec-
tion (p. 304). Almost immediately, “[e]verything seemed to go wrong” (p. 
305), and ultimately no Democratic President would make a Supreme Court 
appointment for the next quarter-century. The Senate filibustered Justice 
Abe Fortas, whom President Johnson nominated to serve as Chief Justice, 
with searing attacks on the Warren Court (pp. 305–07); eventually President 
Nixon appointed Warren Burger to replace Chief Justice Warren (p. 318). As 
the Warren Court’s “liberal” majority gradually diminished to only Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, the “Rule of Five” acquired new significance. 
Justice Brennan told Wermiel that he considered his 1970 opinion in 
Goldberg v. Kelly88 to be “probably the most important thing that came out 
of these chambers from me.”89 In Goldberg, Justice Brennan built on his 
1969 opinion for the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson, which found that Con-
necticut’s denial of welfare benefits to a young mother who had moved from 
Massachusetts to be with family violated a fundamental right to travel.90 
Justice Brennan wrote that Connecticut’s one-year residency requirement 
put at stake “the very means to subsist—food, shelter, and other necessities 
of life,”91 a phrase his clerks had warned risked losing the Court (p. 337). 
The five-Justice majority in Goldberg held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process required the government to provide welfare recipi-
ents basic procedural safeguards before terminating subsistence-level 
benefits.92 After a welfare caseworker placed him in a hotel that he found 
dangerous and uninhabitable, John Kelly moved out; the caseworker re-
sponded by terminating Kelly’s benefits (p. 340). New York City’s welfare 
system did not afford him an opportunity to challenge the termination and 
explain the reason for his move. In order to find a right to a pretermination 
hearing, the Court found that the provision of welfare benefits, though vol-
untarily provided and not a substantive right, constituted a form of property 
for purposes of the Due Process Clause.93  
Although five Justices initially voted to provide some process, Justices 
Harlan and Byron White did not support treating government benefits fully 
like other property, while Justice Douglas believed that welfare should be 
treated as other recognized forms of property (pp. 341–42). In typical fash-
ion, Justice Brennan acceded to substantial changes to his draft opinion in 
order to retain the votes of those to his ideological right, including substitut-
ing a discussion of the values of “self-sufficiency and patriotism” for the 
plight of the poor and the societal causes of poverty, and eliminating any 
hint of a substantive due process right to subsistence-level benefits (pp. 342–
43). With these concessions, “Brennan had his fifth vote for a ruling laying 
                                                                                                                      
 88. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 89. P. 346; see also p. 336 (noting that Justice Brennan considered Goldberg to be 
“perhaps the proudest achievement of his entire tenure on the Court”). 
 90. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
 91. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627.  
 92. Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254. 
 93. See id. at 262 n.8; see also pp. 340–42. 
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out much of what he wanted, in an opinion that afforded welfare recipients 
substantial new rights” (p. 343). As Stern and Wermiel describe, Justice 
Brennan had foreseen the sacrifices that might be necessary and had sug-
gested in a note when Justice Douglas was assigning the opinion that Justice 
Douglas assign it to Justice Harlan in order to “leave us free to join him + 
write more broadly” (pp. 341–42).  
For all their promise, Shapiro and Goldberg did not mark the beginning 
of additional judicial protections for “the very means to subsist”94 or against 
wealth discrimination. For Justice Brennan, these victories must have been 
tinged with regret about what might have been had they come five years 
earlier—or had Chief Justice Warren not resigned. Stern and Wermiel say 
remarkably little about a series of decisions that immediately followed.95 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez96 marked an especially devastating blow for Jus-
tice Brennan’s views on constitutional protections for social and economic 
rights. Texas’s system of funding education through property taxes resulted 
in extreme disparities depending on the wealth of each school district, a sys-
tem that Justice Brennan denounced as “devoid of any rational basis.”97 He 
would have held that education is a fundamental right, the unequal provision 
of which triggers strict scrutiny, for “education is inextricably linked to the 
right to participate in the electoral process and to the rights of free speech 
and association guaranteed by the First Amendment.”98  
Stern and Wermiel’s chapter “Frustration Rising” outlines the shifts on 
the Court and Justice Brennan’s reactions as President Nixon appointed four 
new Justices in three years:99 “Brennan’s combined seventy-two dissenting 
votes in the 1970–71 and 1971–72 terms exceeded the sixty-seven he cast 
during the entire 1960s, and the number per term would only rise as the 
decade progressed” (pp. 351–52). In 1975 President Gerald Ford appointed 
John Paul Stevens to Justice Douglas’s seat (p. 427). Of the five new Justic-
es, Justice William Rehnquist “emerged as the most committed opponent to 
Brennan’s vision of the Constitution” and “the justice with whom Brennan 
agreed with least often” (p. 440). That year, Justice Rehnquist gave a 
speech, clearly aimed at Justice Brennan, in which he disparaged decisions 
based on human dignity or a “living constitution” (p. 440). The chapter 
“Darkest Years” describes not only the death of Justice Brennan’s wife Marjo-
rie after a long struggle with cancer but also President Reagan’s elevation of 
                                                                                                                      
 94. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627. 
 95. They quote a 1990 assessment from Professor Charles Reich: “[T]wenty years later, 
we must confront the fact that the road opened by Goldberg v. Kelly has not been taken.” P. 
345 (quoting Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 
56 Brook. L. Rev. 731, 731 (1990)). Reich was the author of an earlier article, Charles A. 
Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964), that apparently influenced Justice Bren-
nan (and many others) to see government benefits as a form of property. Pp. 338–39. 
 96. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 97. Id. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 63. 
 99. Chapter 15. Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Jr., and William 
Rehnquist replaced Earl Warren, Abe Fortas, Hugo Black, and Marshall Harlan, respectively. 
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Justice Rehnquist to Chief Justice and appointment of three Justices to shift 
the Court further to the ideological right.100 President Jimmy Carter, the only 
Democratic President elected during this period, was the only President in 
U.S. history to serve a full Term without the opportunity to appoint a single 
Supreme Court Justice. 
The biography makes clear that Justice Brennan struggled with how best 
to respond to the radically changed Court. He disliked Chief Justice Burger 
and did not attempt to conceal his lack of respect for him from his law 
clerks (p. 356). Yet in the first years of the Burger Court, he occasionally 
managed to work with the Chief Justice to great effect. In an important 
school desegregation case that Chief Justice Burger questionably assigned to 
himself even though he seemed to be in the minority, Justice Brennan 
worked the Court through six drafts until “[o]nce again, the result looked far 
more similar to what Brennan sought than what Burger had ever intend-
ed.”101  
For a time after Justice Douglas’s 1975 retirement, Justice Brennan 
abandoned the pragmatic approach that had brought him such success, in 
favor of extremely harsh dissents. Stern and Wermiel describe these “shrill” 
dissents, especially during the 1975–76 Term when he used the word “evis-
cerate” to describe the Court’s treatment of precedent on six separate 
occasions (p. 438). The Washington Post labeled his 1976 dissent in Nation-
al League of Cities “as caustic as any written in recent decades.”102 Justice 
Brennan quickly realized that he had erred, both because he had alienated 
the new Justices, including Justice Lewis Powell who would later become a 
“key and unexpected partner” (p. 444), and because, as one of his clerks 
from the period later explained, “[t]elling the lower courts that the majority 
opinion was, however wrong, narrow was a better strategy than telling them 
that the . . . sky was falling” (p. 443). The year that Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor joined the Court, Justice Brennan seemed briefly to forget this 
lesson; “increasingly frustrated by what he viewed as her reflexive conserva-
tism,” he issued a scathing dissent to a 1982 majority opinion she wrote in a 
habeas case, which alienated her and “appalled” Justice Powell (pp. 478–
80).  
Nonetheless, through hard work and accommodation, Justice Brennan 
managed to continue to champion liberal constitutional values with surpris-
ing success against the mounting odds. In describing an early visit to the 
Court by President Reagan and Attorney General Meese, “who would be-
come Brennan’s chief antagonist,” Stern and Wermiel note that President 
Reagan and Attorney General Meese probably would not have believed the 
degree to which Justice Brennan would thwart their agenda (p. 472). For 
                                                                                                                      
 100. Chapter 19. Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy replaced 
Potter Stewart, Harry Blackmun, and Lewis Powell. 
 101. Pp. 356–58 (discussing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 
(1971)). 
 102. P. 441 (discussing Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). 
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example, in 1981 as the Court was deciding Plyler v. Doe103 Justice Brennan 
exerted “enormous effort” to convince Justice Powell to provide the fifth 
vote to strike down a Texas law that denied children a public education if 
they were in the country illegally (pp. 475–76). During months of  
negotiations, Chief Justice Burger privately lobbied Justice Powell; in the 
end, Justice Powell sided with Justice Brennan, but at the cost of any sug-
gestion in the opinion that education was a fundamental right or that 
discrimination against children because of their immigration status triggered 
strict scrutiny and required a compelling justification.104 Under the pressures 
of such fundamental compromises, Justice Brennan developed a reputation 
for planting in his opinions “the seemingly innocuous casual statement or 
footnote—seeds that would be exploited to their logical extreme in a later 
case” (p. 343). By President Reagan’s second term in 1985, the President’s 
“brash young aides . . . . had come to realize they had severely underesti-
mated Brennan” (p. 503).  
Although Justice Brennan apparently did not himself mention it to 
Wermiel, his list of greatest achievements and lasting legacies must include 
the line of opinions issued by the Burger Court that extended the guarantee 
of equal protection to women. Readers will find “Pedestals and Cages” 
(Chapter Sixteen) one of the biography’s most intriguing chapters. When 
then-ACLU attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg first asked the Court to apply 
heightened scrutiny to sex discrimination in 1971, the Justices themselves—
Justice Brennan included—discriminated against women in the hiring of law 
clerks (pp. 386–91). In the late 1960s, Justice Brennan worried about having 
to change his behavior if Justices were to hire female clerks, and he told his 
clerks that if a woman were ever appointed to the Court, he might have to 
resign.105 In a poignant story of Justice Brennan’s refusal in the early 1970s 
to hire now–federal appellate judge Marsha Berzon (his second refusal to 
hire a candidate because she was a woman), Berkeley Professor Stephen 
Barnett directly and honorably confronted the Justice with a thoughtful let-
ter explaining that Justice Brennan’s decision was unprincipled and 
probably illegal.106 Justice Brennan, to his great credit, changed his mind 
and hired Berzon (pp. 400–01), though it would be another seven years be-
fore he hired another female clerk (pp. 476–77).  
The great challenge of incorporating evolving values and constitutional 
rules into settled personal practices is illustrated by Justice Brennan’s re-
sponse to the constitutional question of sex discrimination in a case just 
months before he refused to hire Berzon in his own workplace (p. 399). Jus-
tice Brennan fervently—and somewhat ironically—advocated for applying 
                                                                                                                      
 103. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 104. Pp. 475–76. Justice Powell sent a note thanking Justice Brennan for his “ ‘painstak-
ing and generous’ accommodation of his views.” P. 476. 
 105. P. 388; see also pp. 476–80 (describing Justice Brennan’s early interactions with 
Justice O’Connor). 
 106. Professor Barnett warned of a possible lawsuit against the Justice for discrimina-
tion, and that if subpoenaed he would have to tell the truth. Pp. 399–400. 
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strict judicial scrutiny to protect women; he wrote for four Justices in an 
eloquent opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson of the “long and unfortunate 
history of sex discrimination” that was “rationalized by an attitude of ‘ro-
mantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, 
but in a cage.”107 Unable to convince a majority to adopt strict scrutiny for sex 
discrimination, he wrote a few years later for a seven-to-two Court in Craig v. 
Boren (with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissenting), adopting 
a heightened standard of review in the form of intermediate scrutiny,108 which 
has since served to provide women strong protection. Later, when serving on 
the Court, Justice Ginsburg indicated that Justice Brennan’s initial refusal to 
hire women was not surprising: “He was a man brought up in a certain age” 
(p. 405). This assessment will resonate with women of a certain age, and the 
history “Pedestals and Cages” recounts will instruct people of all ages. 
The biography appropriately opens and closes by spotlighting a success 
that Justice Brennan believed would survive: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC,109 Justice Brennan’s last majority opinion before his 1990 retirement 
(pp. xiii, 532–33). The case involved the constitutionality of preferences for 
historically disadvantaged racial minorities in the absence of particularized 
discrimination (pp. 532–33). Justice Brennan had long provided leadership 
on this issue popularly described as affirmative action. A dozen years earlier 
in 1978, Justice Brennan wrote for four Justices in Bakke that courts should 
defer to the government’s determinations to use race to benefit minorities.110 
He persuaded Justice Powell, who wrote the controlling opinion in Bakke 
(though only for himself), to write more favorably and make clear his view 
that some forms of affirmative action were constitutional (though “quotas” 
were not) (pp. 448–49). In 1988, following several victorious affirmative 
action decisions in which he helped persuade Justice Powell to join (pp. 
498–99), Justice Brennan opined to Wermiel, “They’re not going to unstitch 
affirmative action” (p. 544). 
Within two years, that assessment seemed wrong. By 1990, Justice 
Powell had retired and been replaced by Justice Anthony Kennedy, President 
Reagan’s nominee after the Senate refused to confirm Robert Bork (pp. 
518–20). Justice Kennedy disappointed and angered Justice Brennan by 
providing the fifth vote (with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, 
O’Connor, and Scalia) for a major civil rights defeat in Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union.111 In the end, Justice White (who found it a “tough” case) 
provided the fifth vote for Justice Brennan’s compromise approach in Metro 
                                                                                                                      
 107. 411 U.S. 677, 684, 688 (1973). 
 108. 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976). 
 109. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200 (1995).  
 110. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 111. P. 522; Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). Stern and Wermiel 
fail to note that Congress responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which effectively re-
versed Patterson and the harmful effects of several other five-to-four rulings. See Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2006). 
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Broadcasting, which upheld the use of affirmative action under a heightened 
“intermediate scrutiny” standard of review—the same standard that Justice 
Brennan had crafted as a compromise in the context of sex discrimination 
(pp. 407, 533–35). Justice Brennan did not believe that intermediate scrutiny 
was the ideal standard in either context, but the compromise allowed the 
Court to reach what Justice Brennan viewed as the constitutionally correct 
outcome, recognizing essentially the correct constitutional values.  
Five years after Justice Brennan’s retirement, the Court explicitly over-
ruled Metro Broadcasting’s adoption of intermediate scrutiny, with Justice 
O’Connor writing in Adarand that the Court should strictly scrutinize any 
governmental use of race.112 In 2000, Attorney General Meese cited the 
Court’s shift on affirmative action as one of the “Reagan Revolution’s” 
greatest accomplishments,113 but in Grutter v. Bollinger,114 with Justice 
O’Connor again writing for five Justices and relying heavily on Justice 
Powell’s Bakke decision, the Court moved back in Justice Brennan’s direc-
tion and held that the University of Michigan Law School’s use of race in 
admissions satisfied strict scrutiny.115 The standard of review for affirmative 
action is now firmly set at strict scrutiny, an unfortunate change but, as Jus-
tices O’Connor and Powell applied it, not one that necessarily dooms a 
program. Now the outcome almost certainly will turn on how Justice Ken-
nedy applies it, because four of the current Justices are committed to a 
“colorblind” approach that is hostile to all affirmative action.116 Early on, 
Justice Brennan spoke against the notion of colorblindness, and under his 
vision of equal protection, affirmative action—if properly tailored—can 
clearly survive strict judicial scrutiny (p. 210).  
Despite its general comprehensiveness, the biography neglects a few 
surprising areas. For example, the Reagan Administration not only targeted 
the Court’s authority to protect rights under the charge of “judicial activism” 
but also pursued its own “judicial activism” through new, judicially en-
forced, federalism-based limits on Congress’s authority to enact laws, 
                                                                                                                      
 112. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 207 (1995). 
 113. When asked in 2000 what he regarded as “the Reagan Administration’s biggest 
originalist success in litigation,” former Attorney General Meese cited the Rehnquist Court’s 
treatment of congressional power and federalism, as well as affirmative action. Edwin Meese, 
III & James C. Ho, Dialogue, Reagan’s Legal Revolutionary, 3 Green Bag 2d 193, 199 
(2000) (“One area of litigation in which the Reagan Administration was most successful in 
returning to constitutional principles was in the area of discrimination on the basis of race and 
sex through quotas and preferences.”). 
 114. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 115. The issue remains live: as this book review goes to press, a challenge to the Univer-
sity of Texas’s admission program pending before the Court threatens Grutter. Fisher v. Univ. 
of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). 
 116. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy recognized constitutionally relevant distinc-
tions between laws aimed at harming African Americans and those that take note of race in 
order to achieve compelling interests. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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including laws that protect rights.117 These efforts came to partial fruition 
under Chief Justice Rehnquist’s leadership, including in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, a decision that undermined Justice Brennan’s important civil rights-
era opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan.118 Stern and Wermiel do not discuss 
Katzenbach, which expansively interpreted Congress’s authority to protect 
rights pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment and upheld a 
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that prohibited certain uses of 
literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting. Also surprising, the biography de-
votes only a few paragraphs to describing the “epic” battle in which the 
Senate refused to confirm Robert Bork to the Court (pp. 518–19), an inci-
dent that provided one natural vehicle for fleshing out details of the 
competing constitutional vision that the Reagan Administration offered to 
replace that of Justice Brennan and the Warren Court.  
In a few respects, Stern and Wermiel’s assessments of Justice Brennan’s 
legacy seem unduly negative and unsupported: among them, that Justice 
Brennan’s decisions contributed to a “forty-year-long conservative back-
lash” (pp. xiii–xiv) and that he was prone to “what ifs” that sidestepped his 
own responsibility (pp. 316–18). In light of the twenty-three years during 
which Justice Brennan toiled without new Democratically appointed col-
leagues, some readers will feel that he is entitled to his “what ifs”—and that 
progressives today might take inspiration from them.119 This biography 
gives rise to another “what if”: what if his wife Marjorie (among others) had 
not persuaded Justice Brennan to reconsider when in 1979 he had all but 
decided to retire, in large part to take care of her during her thirteen-year 
struggle with cancer (pp. 456–60)? Instead, over another decade, he contin-
ued to build a legacy that remains in force, in the words of Supreme Court 
journalist Linda Greenhouse, to a “quite remarkable” extent.120  
On the overarching issue of interpretive methodology, Stern and Werm-
iel seem too quick to give the legacy edge to Attorney General Meese’s call 
for originalism and judicial restraint over Justice Brennan’s “increasingly 
anachronistic” notion of “a living constitution to be adapted flexibly to con-
temporary circumstances” (p. 546). Stern and Wermiel cite “liberal 
ambivalence about Brennan’s style of activism” and the “growing sense even 
among his fans that his unabashedly activist approach to judging belonged to 
a bygone era” (p. 546). Among their evidence that “[c]onservatives had gained 
the upper hand in the public debate over the proper method of constitutional 
interpretation,” they note President Obama’s statement that although Justice 
                                                                                                                      
 117. See Johnsen, supra note 11 (discussing Department of Justice documents targeting 
congressional authorities for new, judicially enforced limitations).  
 118. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 
641 (1966).  
 119. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Selective Judicial Activism, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1423, 
1429–30 (2011) (reviewing Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion) (imagining what constitu-
tional law might look like if a majority of Justices shared Justice Brennan’s constitutional 
vision). 
 120. P. 544 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, who then served as the Supreme Court reporter 
for the New York Times). 
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Brennan is one of his heroes, Justice Brennan’s judicial philosophy may not 
be appropriate for today, as well as then-nominee Sotomayor’s efforts to 
distance herself from Justice Brennan’s philosophy and the value of empa-
thy.121 The final section of this Review will make the contrary case—that 
with regard to constitutional interpretation, Justice Brennan continues to 
prevail over traditional originalists. In the end, these are relatively small 
quibbles with a biography that provides a thorough, useful, and inspiring 
account of the work of one of our greatest Justices.  
III. Enduring Legacy 
The context in which Justice Brennan labored to “get to five” on the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts bears repeating: When Justice Brennan retired 
in 1990, a Democratic President had not appointed a Supreme Court Justice 
since 1967. During those twenty-three years, Republican Presidents ap-
pointed eight Justices and promoted Justice William Rehnquist to Chief 
Justice. When Justice Clarence Thomas succeeded Justice Marshall, that 
number rose to ten consecutive Republican appointments in twenty-four 
years. Beyond the numbers, the Reagan Administration sought to use its 
judicial appointments to effectuate radical legal change on the major consti-
tutional issues of the day. It specially targeted Justice Brennan’s “judicial 
activism” and constitutional methodology, seeking to replace his “living 
Constitution” approach with “originalism.”122 Voluminous Department of 
Justice reports detailed the Administration’s substantive agenda, including 
lists of Court decisions deemed wrongly decided, many of which Justice 
Brennan had authored or critically shaped.123 The reports cited approvingly 
the opinions and views of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Judge Robert Bork. 
At the political and semantic levels, “[o]riginalism remains even now a 
powerful vehicle for conservative mobilization.”124 The terms “living Con-
stitution” and “liberal” are out of vogue, largely replaced by “progressive.” 
This hardly proves, however, that the substantive content of Justice Bren-
nan’s constitutional vision and interpretive approach has become 
“anachronistic” and abandoned by progressives, or that originalism has 
fared better in the realm of doctrine. To the contrary, almost a quarter-
century later, Justice Brennan’s extraordinary achievements on the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts endure in substantial measure. 
                                                                                                                      
 121. P. 546; see also supra text accompanying note 26. 
 122. See pp. 472–73, 504–07. Soon after President Reagan’s election, Attorney General 
Smith gave a speech indicating that the Department of Justice would change its approach to 
busing and affirmative action, and in a later speech, he promised judicial appointees “who 
understand the meaning of judicial restraint.” P. 473. See also supra note 14 (discussing state-
ments of Reagan Administration officials).  
 123. E.g., Constitution in 2000, supra note 11; Guidelines, supra note 14; see also 
Johnsen, supra note 11, at 367, 385–86, 389–90, 398–99 (discussing reports). 
 124. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 545, 546 (2006). 
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A. “Judicial Activism” 
As to the charge of judicial activism, Justice Brennan spoke to when and 
why the Court should take an active role in upholding the Constitution less 
in his judicial opinions—which, again, must be read as they were written, 
through the lens of the “Rule of Five”—and more in his public speeches and 
interviews.125 From early in his tenure, Justice Brennan emphasized the 
Court’s duty to act: “Where the Constitution is violated, judges have no 
choice but to say so” (p. 233). He denied the caricature of his decisions as 
driven by mere political preferences: “The Court is not a council of Platonic 
guardians given the function of deciding our most difficult and emotional 
questions according to the Justices’ own notions of what is just or wise or 
politic” (p. 233). Rather, he explained, “Just as an individual may be untrue 
to himself, so may society be untrue to itself . . . . The Court’s reviewing 
function, then, can be seen as an attempt to keep the community true to its 
own fundamental principles.”126 
Supreme Court rulings since Justice Brennan’s retirement disprove the 
charge that judicial activism is a liberal phenomenon and judicial restraint a 
virtue of the ideological right. In dispute instead is the content of the “fun-
damental principles” (p. 234) that, as Justice Brennan correctly observed, at 
times demand active judicial review. Each of the three prominent cases that 
the New York Times recently cited as possible factors influencing the Court’s 
greatly diminished public approval rating127 involve “activism” from the 
right that reflects the Justices’ contrasting values: in the case of Bush v. 
Gore, reaching out to resolve a presidential election,128 and in Citizens Unit-
ed, reaching out to overrule longstanding precedent and a federal statute to 
afford corporations new constitutionally protected rights to electioneer 
without congressional regulation.129 The third case, Sebelius,130 is compli-
cated by Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to provide the fifth vote to uphold 
core provisions of the Affordable Care Act, yet agree with the four dissent-
ers—who would have struck down the law—that the law exceeded 
Congress’s commerce power.131 The ideological right’s positions in these 
                                                                                                                      
 125. P. 233. Professor Tushnet has observed that the Warren Court was surprisingly un-
concerned with articulating a theory of judicial restraint and explaining when a more active 
role was warranted. Tushnet, supra note 45, at 750.  
 126. P. 234. Criticism has been leveled at Justices for speaking publicly. E.g., Editorial, 
Supreme Court Sows Distrust with Justices’ Political Activity, Bos. Globe, June 11, 2012, at 
A12. This criticism is misguided and shortsighted. As the comments quoted in the preceding 
paragraph demonstrate, public understanding, and ultimately democracy, benefit from Justices 
taking part in public discourse and sharing their legal and personal views and philosophies.  
 127. See Liptak & Kopicki, supra note 1. 
 128. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 129. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 130. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 131. Id. at 2591 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2642–44 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
Alito, JJ., dissenting).  
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and many other cases decided after Justice Brennan’s retirement called for a 
strong judicial role, counter to congressional statute or Supreme Court prec-
edent, thereby flipping the charge of activism leveled at Justice Brennan.  
Disagreements among Justices thus often fundamentally rest not on 
whether, but under what circumstances, the Court should take an active 
stance. On which issues and in furtherance of which constitutional values 
should a Justice be active? For example, the Court’s ruling in Citizens Unit-
ed that Congress could not limit corporations’ independent campaign 
expenditures reflected highly contested views on a range of issues: Are cor-
porations merely associations of individuals entitled to the same “free 
speech” rights as natural persons?132 Are they among the most valuable par-
ticipants in public discourse on economic policy?133 Are unlimited corporate 
campaign expenditures likely to undermine Americans’ confidence in the 
outcome of elections?134 How does the right of a corporation to engage in 
unlimited independent expenditures relate to other restrictions the Court 
previously upheld, for example, on the ability of letter carriers and other 
government employees to participate in electoral politics?135 The Roberts 
Court not only came down on the pro-corporate side of these questions in 
Citizens United but also increasingly has ruled in favor of corporate interests 
across cases and issues—and without the support of originalist arguments.136 
In another review of the biography, Professor Geoffrey Stone helpfully 
explores the principles that guided Justice Brennan in his “selective judicial 
activism.”137 Professor Stone notes that all Justices are selectively activist, so 
the challenge is to discern the principles that dictate when they take an activist 
                                                                                                                      
 132. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (“The Court has thus rejected the argument 
that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under 
the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’ ” (quoting 
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))). 
 133. See id. at 912 (“On certain topics corporations may possess valuable expertise, 
leaving them the best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all sorts, including 
the speech of candidates and elected officials.”); id. at 929 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Indeed, to 
exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the modern free econ-
omy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech to the public 
debate.”). 
 134. Id. at 910 (majority opinion) (“The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, 
will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”). 
 135. Id. at 899 (“The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate 
to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in allowing 
governmental entities to perform their functions.”). 
 136. See Neil Weare, Developing: Court Rules in Chamber’s Favor in Every 
Case Decided So Far This Term, Constitutional Accountability Ctr. (June 21, 
2012), http://www.theusconstitution.org/text-history/1484/developing-court-rules-chamber’s-
favor-every-case-decided-so-far-term (discussing the significant increase in the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce’s success rate during the Roberts Court as compared with earlier Courts); see 
also Constitutional Accountability Ctr., Issue Brief No. 6, Big Wins for Big Busi-
ness: Themes and Statistics in the Supreme Court’s 2010–2011 Business Cases (2011), 
available at http://theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/Download %20Big%20Wins 
%20for%20Big%20Business%20Here.pdf (same). 
 137. Stone, supra note 119.  
Johnsen FTP 4_C.doc 3/13/2013 8:58 AM 
1176 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 111:1151 
stance.138 After describing Alexander Hamilton’s view that judges “have a 
duty to resist invasions of constitutional rights,” Professor Stone explains, 
“It was this ‘originalist’ conception of judicial review that informed Justice 
Brennan’s selective judicial activism.”139 Professor Stone finds that for Jus-
tice Brennan, the rights that triggered heightened judicial protection 
centered on process concerns akin to those articulated in the Supreme 
Court’s famous footnote four in Carolene Products.140 This captures much 
of what informed Justice Brennan’s approach to judicial review, but not 
all.141  
Beyond the protection of historically disadvantaged groups and demo-
cratic processes, Justice Brennan repeatedly identified human dignity as a 
substantive constitutional value that should guide judicial review across con-
texts. In a 1961 speech, he described “the dignity and worth of the 
individual” as the “supreme value of our American democracy” (p. 418). At 
the end of his tenure, he stated that human dignity was “the basic premise 
on which I build everything under the Constitution” (p. 418). Justice Bren-
nan’s focus on dignity helps explain many of his constitutional 
interpretations, including his commitments to reproductive liberty, criminal 
defendants, death row inmates, and justice for the poor in accessing educa-
tion and the basic necessities of life. He would later highlight as triumphs of 
human dignity both Goldberg v. Kelly and the Court’s protection of women 
from discriminatory laws that perpetuated archaic stereotypes (p. 423). Stern 
and Wermiel tie his concern for the dignity of people in poverty as well as 
victims of discrimination to his ability to empathize with the plight of oth-
ers, even in circumstances such as these where “personal experience did not 
fuel his empathy” (p. 342). Stern and Wermiel are, however, somewhat criti-
cal of his invoction of dignity, noting that the word does not appear in the 
Constitution’s text and lacks significant precedent (pp. 419, 422). In another 
insightful review of this biography, Professor Frank Michelman helpfully 
characterizes Justice Brennan’s concern with dignity as grounded in “the 
capacity of a being of the human kind for ethical and moral self-
direction.”142 The concept has continued to inform the Court’s interpretation 
of the constitutional guarantee of liberty to protect decisionmaking autono-
                                                                                                                      
 138. Id. at 1429. 
 139. Id. at 1426.  
 140. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see Stone, 
supra note 119, at 1424. 
 141. More specifically, Professor Stone writes that Justice Brennan closely scrutinized 
“(1) when the governing majority systematically disregarded the interests of a historically 
underrepresented group . . . and (2) when there was a risk that a governing majority was using 
its authority to stifle its critics, entrench the status quo, and/or perpetuate its own political 
power.” See Stone, supra note 119, at 1426. Professor John Hart Ely was the most famous 
proponent of a process-based grand theory that would, in Professor Powell’s words, “escape 
the limitations of clause-bound interpretivism.” Powell, supra note 52, at 45. Professor Pow-
ell has written that “Ely has had many admirers but few followers.” Id.  
 142. Michelman, supra note 39, at 1413.  
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my on matters fundamental to self-direction.143 Justice Kennedy—a Justice 
who often casts the deciding fifth vote—places special emphasis on the con-
stitutional value of dignity.144  
Justice Brennan appreciated the challenges and nuances of the proper 
role of a Justice’s values and took extraordinary care not to allow his per-
sonal values and beliefs, including religious beliefs, to influence his 
constitutional decisionmaking in ways that would have been inappropri-
ate.145 He often felt duty bound to rule counter to his personal values, his 
religious beliefs, or the teachings of the Catholic Church, including with 
regard to prayer and Bible reading in school, contraception and abortion, 
obscenity, and gender discrimination. Nor did he limit his involvement to 
working behind the scenes in such cases of conflict to avoid controversy. In 
Eisenstadt v. Baird,146 he authored an exceptionally powerful, often-quoted 
statement on the right of unmarried individuals to use contraception, a deci-
sion that he recognized would support the legalization of abortion.147 In 
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,148 he labored mightily 
over a lengthy, separate concurrence explaining why school-led reading of 
Bible passages violated the Establishment Clause (pp. 172–74). His leader-
ship on obscenity and the unavoidable viewing of sexually explicit material 
caused him great public embarrassment, including in his church. He de-
scribed the “terrible experience” of being the only member of a large 
Catholic congregation who refused to stand to recite a pledge not to view 
indecent and immoral motion pictures (p. 172). Justice Brennan explained 
his approach to the protection of controversial constitutional rights with 
which his personal beliefs were in conflict when discussing the issue of 
abortion in a 1987 interview with Wermiel:  
I wouldn’t under any circumstances condone an abortion in my private life 
. . . . But that has nothing to do with whether or not those who have 
                                                                                                                      
 143. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“These matters, involving 
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 144. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions 
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 Yale L.J. 1694 (2008) (relating dignity as a constitutional value to 
both liberty and equal protection). 
 145. In fact, far from merely deciding cases based on personal values, Justice Brennan 
devoted great care to his work and found some of his close allies on the Court lacking in this 
regard. Justice Brennan expressed disappointment in the work ethic of both Justice Douglas 
and Justice Marshall. See p. 283 (“[Justice Douglas] was slipshod in what he did.”); supra 
note 43 (describing Justice Marshall’s apparent lack of interest). 
 146. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 147. P. 370 (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, mar-
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” (quoting 
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453)). 
 148. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). 
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different views are entitled to have them and are entitled to be protected in 
their exercise of them. That’s my job in applying and interpreting the 
Constitution. (p. 372) 
B. Originalism and the Living Constitution 
When Justice Brennan described a living Constitution approach to con-
stitutional interpretation in an October 1985 speech delivered at Georgetown 
University, the press incorrectly assumed that it was a direct response to one 
delivered by Attorney General Meese shortly before, even though Justice 
Brennan used “language identical to what he said in speeches for two dec-
ades” and had begun preparing this particular speech several weeks before 
Attorney General Meese’s address (pp. 504–06). Thus began an unusually 
sharp and very public debate between executive branch officials and a sitting 
Supreme Court Justice.149 Attorney General Meese’s speech, “Jurisprudence 
of Original Intention,” presented a search for the Framers’ original intent as 
a desirable, objective alternative to “the radical egalitarianism and expansive 
civil libertarianism” that resulted when Justices—a clear but unspoken ref-
erence to Justice Brennan—interpreted the Constitution “to mean whatever 
they wanted” (p. 504).  
Justice Brennan provided a powerful critique of originalism, warning of 
the difficulty of ascertaining the Framers’ intent and, in colorful, quotable 
terms, of the impropriety of originalism’s “facile historicism” and “arro-
gance cloaked as humility” (p. 505). In describing the proper interpretive 
approach, Justice Brennan used language rooted in the Court’s longstanding 
interpretive tradition: Brennan described “the genius of the Constitution” as 
resting on “the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current prob-
lems and current needs” (p. 505). This language was reminiscent of Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s words in McCulloch v. Maryland: “[W]e must never 
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding,” a Constitution “intended 
to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs.”150 The debate continued the next year in the context 
of President Reagan’s nomination and the Senate’s rejection of Robert Bork, 
whose writings on originalism attacked as illegitimate Supreme Court rul-
ings that expansively protected, for example, expression under the First 
Amendment, women under the guarantee of equal protection, and the right 
to privacy recognized in Griswold.151 
Justice Brennan prevailed in the immediate sense, as Stern and Wermiel 
acknowledge: “[T]he originalism that Attorney General Edwin Meese advo-
cated . . . in his public debate with Brennan never took hold” (p. 546). No 
such traditional version of originalism has in any legal sense prevailed. In 
the decades since the Brennan–Meese debate, constitutional scholars, Su-
                                                                                                                      
 149. Justice John Paul Stevens also delivered a speech that mentioned Attorney General 
Meese by name twenty-eight times. P. 506.  
 150. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819). 
 151. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
Ind. L.J. 1, 8–9, 11–12 (1971). 
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preme Court Justices, and government lawyers have developed and critiqued 
numerous variations on originalism, which run the full ideological gamut: 
from Justice Scalia’s heavy dependence on original expected application, 
which is flatly inconsistent with Justice Brennan’s approach, to an approach 
that Professor Jack Balkin recently detailed in a book entitled Living 
Originalism,152 to Justices and scholars who consider original meaning 
(whether or not they use the term) as one among the range of sources to 
which the Court has traditionally looked in interpreting the Constitution. 
This diversity of “originalisms” enabled Justice Elena Kagan in her confir-
mation hearing to declare, “[W]e are all originalists,” and to describe a form 
of originalism much more akin to Justice Brennan’s living constitutionalism 
than Attorney General Meese’s originalism.153 She noted that the Framers 
looked ahead “generations and generations and generations” when crafting 
the Constitution: “[S]ometimes they laid down very specific rules. Some-
times they laid down broad principles. Either way we apply what they say, 
what they meant to do. So in that sense, we are all originalists.”154  
Thus, even as progressives vigorously debate the value and propriety of 
expressly adopting some version of originalism, rather than ceding the term 
to those on the ideological right, Justice Brennan’s essential approach lives 
on among all sides. For example, Professor Balkin’s affirmation of a form of 
original meaning he calls “framework originalism” embraces a form of liv-
ing constitutionalism: “[W]e do not face a choice between living 
constitutionalism and fidelity to the original meaning of the text. They are 
two sides of the same coin.”155 In an earlier article, Professor Balkin made a 
strong though controversial argument that fidelity to text and principle at the 
                                                                                                                      
 152. Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2011). 
 153. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 62–63 (2010) (statement of Elena Kagan). 
 154. Id. at 61–62. She also implicitly rejected Justice Roberts’s “umpire” analogy while 
acknowledging the value of a judge’s capacity for empathy: 
Judging is not a robotic or automatic enterprise, especially on the cases that get to the 
Supreme Court. A lot of them are very difficult. And people can disagree about how the 
constitutional text or precedent—how they apply to a case.  
But it’s law all the way down, regardless. 
. . . .  
. . . [I]n approaching any case, a judge is required really, not only permitted, but required 
to think very hard about what each party is saying, to try to see that case from each par-
ty’s eyes; in some sense, to think about the case in the best light for each party, and then 
to weigh those against each other. 
. . . .  
But at the end of the day, what the judge does is to apply the law. And as I said, it might 
be hard sometimes to figure out what the law requires in any given case, but it’s [law] all 
the way down.  
Id. at 103. 
 155. Balkin, supra note 152, at 20.  
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proper level of generality supports a constitutional right to decide whether to 
have an abortion.156 Professor David Strauss, on the other hand, rejects pro-
gressive efforts to appropriate the originalism label in his book, unabashedly 
entitled The Living Constitution.157 Professor Strauss, however, recognizes 
that some originalists “define ‘original meaning’ in a way that ends up mak-
ing originalism indistinguishable from a form of living constitutionalism.”158 
The mainstream of both judicial interpretation and academic commentary—
to my mind correctly—considers the Framers’ original understanding as just 
one among many traditional sources and methods of interpretation, in essen-
tially a “living” approach to interpretation.159  
Additional indirect support for Justice Brennan’s legacy of living consti-
tutionalism may be derived from an unlikely source: attempts to reconcile 
traditional, narrow forms of originalism with now-bedrock cases that protect 
individual rights in applications not specifically contemplated by the Fram-
ers. Most well known among them, Professor Michael McConnell’s 
originalist argument for Brown v. Board of Education160 is generally viewed 
as an impressive but ultimately unsuccessful effort.161 Justice Scalia, an 
originalism adherent who would preserve at least some bedrock cases either 
by declaring the text clear (as in Brown) or by resorting to stare decisis, has 
repeatedly stated that the Court’s gender discrimination doctrine is wrong as 
an original matter because the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment clear-
                                                                                                                      
 156. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 291 (2008).  
 157. David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution (2010). 
 158. Id. at 10–11. 
 159. For example, Professors Geoffrey Stone and William Marshall emphasize fidelity to 
the Framers at the level of principle, as well as the lessons of the Court’s most famous foot-
note: footnote four in Carolene Products. Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, The 
Framers’ Constitution, Democracy, Summer 2011, at 61, 61–63, available at http:// 
www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/ 21/the_framers_constitution.pdf. In an influential early arti-
cle published the same year as the Brennan–Meese debate, Professor Powell marshals the 
evidence that the Framers did not intend their specific expectations to be the primary tool for 
future generations to use when interpreting the Constitution. H. Jefferson Powell, The Origi-
nal Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985). In a later insightful book, 
Professor Powell offers a “historicist” account of constitutional law, with illustrative historical 
episodes, that concludes with “shared constitutional first principles”—among them an inter-
pretive tradition that relies upon a range of sources and methods, from text and original 
meaning to the consequences of differing interpretations. H. Jefferson Powell, A Commu-
nity Built on Words 7, 205, 208 (2002). Justice Breyer similarly argues for the use of 
“traditional legal tools, such as text, history, tradition, precedent, and purposes and related 
consequences” when interpreting the Constitution, with an emphasis on purposes and conse-
quences. Breyer, supra note 13, at 74. 
 160. Professor Marshall persuasively explains that several now-landmark cases—
including Reynolds v. Sims, which articulated the principle of “one person, one vote” and was 
made possible by Justice Brennan’s efforts—resulted from “progressive constitutionalism” 
and could not be explained by either originalism or judicial restraint. William P. Marshall, 
Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance of Landmark Decisions in 
Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 1251 (2011). 
 161. See Balkin, supra note 152, at 105, 226–27 (discussing Michael W. McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947 (1995)). 
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ly did not intend the Equal Protection Clause to protect women from dis-
crimination.162 In a sign that Justice Brennan’s gender discrimination cases 
may be entering the category of iconic cases alongside Brown, Federalist 
Society cofounder and leading originalist Professor Steven Calabresi, writ-
ing with Professor Julia Rickert, recently offered an originalist argument in 
favor of these cases.163 A vibrant debate has ensued among traditional and 
new originalists about the implications of the Calabresi–Rickert spin on 
originalism for reproductive rights and marriage discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.  
Thus, perhaps it can be said that not only are we all originalists, but at 
least with regard to the superprecedents we are also all living constitutional-
ists. We are all judicial activists as well, though in pursuit of different 
constitutional values premised on varying constitutional theories. Stern and 
Wermiel’s biography paints a clear picture of Justice Brennan’s view of a 
judiciary properly active on behalf of protecting individual rights, human dig-
nity, and democratic legitimacy. The biography’s detailed recounting of cases 
spanning Justice Brennan’s more than three decades on the Court again and 
again affirms the wisdom of an interpretive approach that remains in the 
mainstream of both judicial interpretation and academic commentary—one 
that considers the Framers’ original understanding as one of the sources and 
methods of interpretation which include, in Justice Breyer’s words, “tradi-
tional legal tools, such as text, history, tradition, precedent, and purposes 
and related consequences.”164 Among their numerous illustrations, Stern and 
Wermiel remind us that when Justice Brennan led the Court to recognize 
that romantic paternalism put women in “cage[s]” not on “pedestal[s],” the 
Justices fortunately did not feel bound by the Framers’ prejudices (p. 392). 
The Justices even proved capable of transcending their own stereotypes and 
discomfort about women’s changing roles in favor of an evolving apprecia-
tion of what equal protection of the laws requires. Constitutional debate and 
change are inherent in the system, but nearly a quarter-century after his re-
tirement, Justice Brennan’s legacy remains strong and vital. 
                                                                                                                      
 162. Most recently, on NPR in July 2012. See Nina Totenberg, Interviewing Scalia: 
Verbal Wrestling Match with a Master, NPR (July 25, 2012), http://www.npr.org/ 
blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/07/25/157384080/interviewing-scalia-verbal-wrestling-match-with-a-
master.  
 163. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2011) (noting that they are “taking issue” with Justices Scalia and Ginsburg 
as well as many legal scholars, most notably Professors Michael Dorf, Ward Farnsworth, and 
Reva Siegel). 
 164. Breyer, supra note 13, at 74. 
